The period from the 1967 war to the
first Lebanon War in the early 1980s can fairly be said to have been
a halcyon era in the American Jewish community's relationship with
Israel. During that period – and during that period alone --
American Jewry spoke in one voice about Israel: in solid support of
the actions of the elected Israeli government. Ever since, things
have been a little more complicated.
The fissures in the American Jewish
community over Israel are examined in detail in Dov Waxman's new
book, Trouble in the Tribe: The American Jewish Conflict Over
Israel. Waxman, a professor of
political science and Israel studies at Northwestern University, uses
survey data and contemporary records to trace the development of the
American Jewish “conversation” (more recently, “argument”)
over Israel from the early 70s through today. He finds that, although
the opinions of American Jews on Israel's actions, particularly
around its treatment of the Palestinians under its control, have
changed, their emotional connection to Israel (consistently at 60-75%
over the years) has not.
Much
of this story is in tracing the development of what the pro-Israel
left in this country. In the 1970s, the first of these organizations,
Breira (“choice”), was made up of Jewish professionals and called
for a Palestinian state and talks with the PLO – almost two decades
before Oslo. But the Jewish community then was dedicated to uni-vocal
support of Israel, and Breira was outside those lines, so it was
destroyed, its participants blacklisted
from communal
employment.
Since
then, numerous other such organizations have arisen. The most
successful of these, J Street, describes itself as “pro-Israel,
pro-peace,” supporting a two-state solution and – here's the
innovation - American pressure on the Israeli government to help
convince it to come to such a political deal with the Palestinians. A
more radical organization, Jewish
Voice for Peace, advocates boycotts, divestment and sanctions (BDS)
against Israel; this, Waxman notes, puts it “beyond the pale” for
a Jewish organization, and thus JVP is not included in the American
Jewish “tent,” and Waxman pays little attention to it.
The
question of whether the more moderate J Street belongs “in the
tent” is a vexing one; in 2014, the Conference of Presidents of
Major Jewish Organizations voted not to allow J-Street to become a
member, with the vote going according to the usual fissures these
days: the bigger, more liberal organizations – the Reform and
Conservative denominations, the Anti-Defamation League and National
Council of Jewish Women voted to include J-Street, while the more
small, more politically conservative and Orthodox organizations –
such as the National
Council of Young Israel and the
Zionist Organization of America, voted against.
Which brings up an
interesting point: criticism of Israeli policy does not only emanate
from the left. The rightist organizations are often quite vocal in
opposition to certain Israeli policies, particularly accommodation
with the Palestinians and territorial compromise. Yet while whether
leftists are allowed in the tent or not remains ever-controversial,
rarely are rightists, no matter how extreme, prohibited from speaking
at a synagogue or Hillel.
Concurrently
with all this, Waxman traces the growth and development of the
mainstream Israel advocacy organizations, AIPAC and the Conference of
Presidents. The question of who, exactly, these organizations
represent is an important one. The answer, according to Waxman, is
that they represent the people in the room. AIPAC draws over 14,000
people to its yearly conferences, and it has activists in virtually
every congressional district in the country. However, its membership
skews older and more politically conservative, than the Jewish
community as a whole. And as with Jewish Federations, the focus on
financial support means that the “target audience” is a smaller
group of wealthy people, rather than the larger body of Jews.
We're in a time
when younger Jews, when they choose to be Jewishly active, prefer to
affiliate with organizations that they develop and that reflect their
priorities – social justice, environmental, participatory
spirituality – rather than join mainstream organizations with huge
infrastructure and a particularistic vision, such as fear of
antisemitism or uncritical support of an Israel.
We are also in a
time when an entire generation of Jews from intermarried households
are coming of age and, as Waxman points out, such young people are
less committed to religious practice, institutional membership, and
political support of Israel. If the community doesn't meet their
needs, they are as likely to drop out as to put in the time and
effort to change it. Meanwhile, the rates of birth and affiliation
within the Orthodox community are higher, and rates of intermarriage
are virtually non-existent. While the Orthodox currently comprise
around 10% of the American Jewish community, another 50 years of the
current demographic trends might show another story.
Waxman's sympathies
are clearly with the Zionist left. He thinks it is foolish for
mainstream communal organizations to oppose groups like J-Street,
which want to be part of the conversation and which, while small in
comparison with AIPAC, represent significant numbers of (particularly
younger) Jews.
The most
challenging part of all of this is how difficult it has become for
people to have conversations with each other beyond the boundaries of
their various camps. Invective flows freely – typical in this
internet age. Progressive rabbis and other communal professionals are
so fearful of triggering a negative reaction that they choose not to
discuss Israel at all. Thus, as Waxman convincingly demonstrates in
this valuable and important book, the very thing that once united the
American Jewish community – Israel – now is the thing that
divides us most of all.
